According to Dennett's take on the hard problem, which statement best summarizes his position?

According to Dennett's take on the hard problem, which statement best summarizes his position?

• A. The hard problem is an illusion, and p-zombies are impossible.
• B. The hard problem is unsolvable and consciousness is a mystery.
• C. Consciousness is a non-physical property that emerges beyond the brain.
• D. Consciousness is like a light switch that turns on at some point.

Answer: (A)

At the heart of Dennett’s view is that the so‑called hard problem is a misframing. He argues there isn’t a mysterious, non-physical “something it’s like” behind experience; everything about consciousness can be explained in terms of brain functions and cognitive processes. That means there isn’t a separate, extra phenomenon to explain beyond what physics and neuroscience already describe. Philosophical zombies—the idea of a being that behaves exactly like us but has no conscious experience—pose a challenge to non-physical theories. Dennett treats such a concept as not really a plausible possibility given a complete, scientifically informed account of brain processes. If a creature acts, reasons, and reports experiences in the same way, his view is that there isn’t a room left for a hidden, non-physical consciousness to exist separately. So, the hard problem, in his view, is an illusion, and p-zombies are impossible. The other options invoke mystery, non-physical properties, or a sudden “switch” into consciousness—stances that Dennett rejects in favor of a thoroughgoing physicalist, functional explanation of consciousness.

At the heart of Dennett’s view is that the so‑called hard problem is a misframing. He argues there isn’t a mysterious, non-physical “something it’s like” behind experience; everything about consciousness can be explained in terms of brain functions and cognitive processes. That means there isn’t a separate, extra phenomenon to explain beyond what physics and neuroscience already describe.

Philosophical zombies—the idea of a being that behaves exactly like us but has no conscious experience—pose a challenge to non-physical theories. Dennett treats such a concept as not really a plausible possibility given a complete, scientifically informed account of brain processes. If a creature acts, reasons, and reports experiences in the same way, his view is that there isn’t a room left for a hidden, non-physical consciousness to exist separately. So, the hard problem, in his view, is an illusion, and p-zombies are impossible.

The other options invoke mystery, non-physical properties, or a sudden “switch” into consciousness—stances that Dennett rejects in favor of a thoroughgoing physicalist, functional explanation of consciousness.